We analyse the ability of the distance to default and subordinated bond spreads to signal bank fragility in a sample of EU banks. We find leading properties for both indicators. The distance to default exhibits lead times of 6-18 months. Spreads have signal value close to problems only. We also find that implicit safety nets weaken the predictive power of spreads. Further, the results suggest complementarity between both indicators. We also examine the interaction of the indicators with other information and find that their additional information content may be small but not insignificant. The results suggest that market indicators reduce type II errors relative to predictions based on accounting information only.
one convenient indicator. Moreover, market information is available at a very high frequency relative to accounting information and market information is inherently more forward looking than accounting data. Hence, it has been proposed that supervisors use these signals as screening devices or inputs into early warning models geared at identifying banks, which should be more closely scrutinised. 1 This paper investigates the second question and aims to ascertain the quality (i.e. predictive power and classification errors) of two market indicators as leading indicators of bank fragility in Europe. Previous work has established that the prices of banks' securities reflect contemporaneous information about banks' risks in the U.S. and also in Europe.
2 This paper builds on this finding by examining whether market prices can predict future fragility. We focus on two indicators: the spread on subordinated debt issued by the bank relative to the risk free rate and the equity market-based distance to default (KMV 2003) . We test whether these indicators are useful in predicting a material weakening in banks' condition. In the absence of actual bank bankruptcies and lack of access to consistent supervisory ratings in Europe, we measure banks' financial condition through Fitch/IBCA individual ratings. We use a downgrade to C or below as our measure of bank fragility and document that this was almost always followed by a government or parent bank intervention within one year's time.
Employing two different econometric models-a logit model and a proportional hazard model-we find support in favour of using both indicators as leading indicators of bank fragility, regardless of the econometric specification. The logit models suggest that the distance to default predicts downgrades between 6 and 18 months in advance, while its predictive properties are weak closer to failure. In contrast, spreads' predictive powers diminish beyond 12 months prior to a downgrade. We also argue in the paper that a proportional hazard model may be quite suitable when predicting downgrades. It measures the probability of being downgraded within a time period, conditional on having survived (not being downgraded) up to the starting point of that interval. The proportional hazard model highlights the time dimension of the relationship between the indicators and the downgrade. It reveals that distances to default have to be observed for relatively long periods before they yield useful information. Combining distances to default with spreads in the same model reduces this time period. In a forecasting context, proportional hazard models have the additional advantage of yielding continuously improving forecasts as the time one observes the indicator increases.
1. Supervisory early warning models combine a set of bank-level financial indicators (balance sheet, income statement, and market indicators), as well as sometimes also other variables (e.g. macroeconomic conditions), to make a prediction about the future state of a bank. A growing number of supervisory agencies have been experimenting with this kind of models (see Gilbert et al. 1999) .
2. There are numerous studies relating U.S. secondary bond and/or stock market data to banks' risk: Hand et al. (1992) , Flannery and Sorescu (1996) , Docking et al. (2000) , Jagtiani et al. (2000) , and Flannery (1998 Flannery ( , 2001 . U.S. primary bond market data: Morgan and Stiroh (2001) . European primary bond market data: Sironi (2003) . European secondary bond and equity market data: Gropp and Richards (2001) . With few exceptions, all studies tend to find a significant relationship between market prices and risk, while risk and market prices are measured in different ways and the methodologies may differ substantially.
Both sets of results indicate that spreads are useful predictors only for banks, which are not implicitly insured against default, while the public safety net does not appear to affect the predictive power of the distance to default. Further, both market indicators provide some additional information relative to accounting variables and we find that the two indicators together have more discriminatory power in predicting failures than each alone. In particular adding market indicators to accounting information and using both indicators in the same model reduces type II errors (a sound bank classified as weak). Hence, our results give some support to the use of market indicators as screening devices or inputs into supervisors' earlywarning models.
A number of recent papers studying U.S. banks are closely related to our work. Curry et al. (2001) find that stock prices exhibit a downward trend as much as two years before a supervisory CAMEL rating downgrade to three, four or five. In addition, adding market variables to standard models containing call report financial data improves their predictive power, especially for banks in the greatest financial distress. Evanoff and Wall (2001) find that accounting information has almost no predictive power for CAMEL and BOPEC supervisory rating downgrades, and subordinated debt spreads perform only insignificantly better. In their paper, spreads tended to classify many more banks as "bad" than a classification based on CAMEL ratings only. Berger et al. (2000) examine the relationship between supervisory information and a number of market indicators (rating changes, abnormal stock returns, and the proportion of equity owned by institutional investors and bank insiders). They find that supervisory assessments and bond ratings are able, at least partially, to predict each other, whereas supervisory assessments and equity indicators are not. DeYoung et al. (2001) take the opposite approach and examine whether on-site examinations produce information that influences market prices. They find that this information is only gradually incorporated in banks' bond spreads with particularly poor supervisory assessments reducing spreads and vice versa. They suggest that markets rely on supervisory discipline as a substitute for market discipline. Krainer and Lopez (2003) investigate whether market prices contain additional information over accounting variables in predicting BOPEC rating changes. They answer this question in the affirmative, but caution that there is no improvement in out-ofsample forecasts. Interestingly, they find, as we do, that debt market indicators have predictive power close to a downgrade only, while equity prices react much earlier.
In the European context, Laviola et al. (2001) examine the forecasting ability of accounting data for Italian banks. While they do not use market information, they employ (like us) proportional hazard models for forecasting bank distress. Bliss and Flannery (2002) argue that the fact that market prices reflect banks' risks does not necessarily imply that they discipline manager's behaviour ("monitoring" versus "influencing"). For a sample of U.S. banks, they find mixed evidence of significant influencing. If managers could perfectly counteract the shocks the bank faces, an increase in e.g. the subordinated debt spread would result in a corrective action, which, in theory, ultimately would take the spread back to its initial level.
This line of reasoning has implications for the use of market indicators as early warning indicators, as it suggests that these indicators may be of use only to the extent that "influencing" works only imperfectly (see also Rajan 2001). 3 One of the main contributions of this paper is its focus on equity prices in addition to spreads. Signals based on equity prices have been considered ill suited, because equity-holders benefit from the upside gains that accrue from increased risk-taking leading to increased asset volatility. The distance to default used in this paper avoids this problem as it combines equity information with information about leverage and asset volatility. 4 There are several other aspects, which suggest that equity prices, properly adjusted, may be attractive as monitoring devices. One, there is broad consensus that the equity markets are quite efficient in processing available information. Second, while bond spreads are conceptually simple, their implementation is difficult. Hancock and Kwast (2001) find that different bonds issued by the same U.S. bank may yield different estimates of the spread and Bliss (2001) demonstrates that spreads may be of little use in predicting ratings, even though positive yield/ rating slopes are often cited as evidence of risk sensitivity. In the European context, the construction of appropriate risk-free benchmarks, which is a necessary ingredient to the calculation of spreads, may also be difficult, especially for smaller countries. Further there may be time varying liquidity premia incorporated in spreads, which may hamper their interpretation as signals of bank fragility. 5 However, there are a number of practical difficulties in the calculation of stock market indicators as well. For example, the distance to default can be sensitive to trading irregularities in the period close to default. Further, it may be sensitive to the actual measure of equity volatility and the distributional assumptions about equity returns used in the calculation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 1 gives our main empirical hypotheses. Section 2 defines our sample and the variables used in the empirical study. Section 3 contains descriptive statistics of the variables of interest. Section 4 reports our econometric specifications and results. Section 5 examines the results in terms of classification errors. Section 6 concludes.
EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES
In this paper we consider the distance to default, DD, and the spread on subordinated debt (relative to risk free debt), S, as bank fragility indicators. Both indicators have been discussed extensively in the previous literature (i.e. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1999, Hancock and Kwast, 2001, KMV, 2003) . They 3. The same applies to supervisors using market indicators to trigger supervisory action. Namely, if this were widespread practice and supervisors acted accordingly, we should not find any predictive power in market indicators. 4. Gropp et al. (2004) show that the distance to default signals greater bank fragility if asset volatility is increasing.
5. See e.g. Elton et al. (2001) , who find that almost half of spreads on corporate bonds are unexplained by default risk or taxes or Huang and Huang (2002) who find that credit risk typically accounts for less than 20% of corporate-treasury yield spreads. represent appropriate indicators of bank fragility in two respects. One, both indicators reflect three crucial factors of bank fragility: (1) the market value of the firm's assets, which represents the discounted value of future revenues; (2) leverage, which captures the obligations the firm has to meet; and (3) the volatility of assets. Second, Gropp et al. (2004) show that they reflect these three sources of risk in the "correct" way, namely both indicators suggest greater fragility for a lower market value of assets, and for higher leverage and asset volatility. 6 Hence, the central objective of this paper is to empirically test for the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The distance to default and the spread on subordinated debt are early warning indicators of a weakening in banks' financial condition.
The indicators may differ with respect to the strength of their reaction to a shock moving the bank closer to the default point. Based on the standard Black and Cox (1976) model for valuing debt, the spread is a convex and decreasing function of the market value of assets, as long as the bank's assets are valued in excess of its liabilities. Gropp et al. (2004) show that the spread therefore responds little to changes in the market value of assets as long as the bank is far from default. This is in contrast to the distance to default, which strongly reacts to adverse shocks also far away from default. Hence, empirically, given that both indicators provide noisy signals, unless we are close to default, only DD may yield a detectable signal, as for S the signal to noise ratio may be quite low.
Hypothesis 2: The distance to default has better predictive ability compared to the spread further away from default.
In case of fully insured debt (like insured deposits), the market value of the debt equals the "no-default-risk" value and there is no signal of fragility obtainable from spreads. However, even for debt not explicitly covered by the safety net, the spread may be uninformative. The market may consider some banks as "too-big-to-fail," for example due to their systemic importance (e.g. Dewatripont and Tirole 1993) . However, useable signals from spreads may be obtained only as long as creditors expect to be repaid in case of bank failure with some probability less than one.
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Similar arguments may also apply to the distance to default. However, in all European countries the case for equity-holders to be bailed out in case of failure is much weaker. Generally, they are not covered even in broad-based explicit safety nets and tend to be explicitly excluded in most deposit insurance laws (Gropp and Vesala 2004) . At a minimum, the haircuts that equity holders take in case of failure may be substantial even for very large systemic banks. Hence, we will test 6. This is in contrast to, say, stock returns, which tend to increase with increases in leverage and volatility. For more discussion see Gropp et al. (2004) .
7. Gropp and Vesala (2004) stress the importance of explicit limits in the safety net for market discipline. They find that banks' risk taking in Europe was reduced in response to the introduction of explicit and restricted deposit insurance schemes. They also find evidence in favour of that a number of banks are "too-big-to-fail." In addition, in a sample of European banks, Gropp and Richards (2001) find that banks' bond spreads do not appear to react to rating announcements. Their findings could be interpreted as evidence in favour of widespread "implicit safety nets."
Hypothesis 3: The spread is a weaker leading indicator of bank fragility than the distance to default for banks covered by an implicit or explicit complete or partial public guarantee.
EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
Our data set consists of monthly observations from January 1991 to March 2001. We use monthly averages of daily data, in order to eliminate some of the noise in high frequency equity and bond prices. The data set consists of those EU banks, for which the necessary rating, equity, and bond market information is available. In the sample selection process we started from 103 EU banks, which had an individual rating from Fitch/IBCA. The sample size was then largely determined by the availability of market data. The two sub-samples used in evaluating the equity and bond market signals consist of 86 and 59 banks, respectively (see Table 1 ), yielding about 5300 bank/month observations for the equity sample and 3600 bank/ month observations for the debt sample. All observations are used to estimate the proportional hazard model.
We estimate logit models at x ϭ 3, 6, 12, 18 and 24-month horizons, i.e. we use the market indicator at time t Ϫ x to estimate the probability of a downgrade at time t. We constructed the respective samples such that we combined each downgrade with all non-downgraded observations for the same time period. 8 The idea is to reduce the potential for spurious results arising from differences in the macroeconomic environment. As in the proportional hazard model, we have multiple observations per bank and hence present all results with standard errors corrected for clustering (i.e. correlated observations within banks). The sample size for the logit model is then around 1000 bank/month observations for the equity sample and 350 for the debt sample. The samples contain banks from 14 (equity sample) and 13 (bond sample) EU countries (Table 1) .
Formal bank bankruptcies have been extremely rare in Europe. Hence, we use a proxy for banks' seriously weakened financial condition, rather than outright default, as the dependent variable. We use the month of the change in Fitch/IBCA's individual rating to C or below. Fitch/IBCA's individual rating is designed to measure the true condition of banks as such, without taking into account the possibility of public or parent bank support. Further details on the rating are given in the Appendix. We selected C or below as our cut-off point, because we found that such a downgrade preceded all cases of serious bank problems in Europe on which public information is available. The correspondence is almost exact both ways. Of the 31 downgrades in our sample period 10 were associated with an injection of public funds, three with a private injection of funds, two with a public or parent guarantee, and 12 with a major restructuring of the banks' operations typically initiated by the supervisor (Table 2) . In four cases, we were unable to ascertain what, if anything, happened after the downgrade. Typically, the intervention took place within a year of the downgrade. We were unable to find any interventions in banks rated by Fitch/IBCA (our universe) that were not preceded by a downgrade to C or below. 9 We argue that if market indicators predicted such a weakening in banks' condition, supervisors could take early corrective action and perhaps avoid the use of public funds on the basis of these signals. Essentially, we use the financial strength rating in a similar way as previous studies have used supervisory ratings in the U.S., mainly because in Europe internal supervisory ratings are either strictly confidential or do not exist.
The distance to default (DD) represents the number of standard deviations away from the default point, where the default point is defined as the point when the assets of the bank are just equal to its liabilities. We calculated the distance to default DD for each bank in the sample and for each time period, t (i.e. month), using that period's equity market data and interpolated balance sheet data. To obtain DD, we calculated 8. To illustrate, suppose we are interested in the 12 months horizon and suppose, for the sake of simplicity, the sample contains only two banks which were downgraded to C or below and ten banks in total. Suppose further that one of these downgrades took place in May of 2000 and the other in October of 1998. Hence, we would select the market indicators for 12 months before May of 2000 (i.e. May of 1999) for all banks for which data exist and similarly select the market indicators for October of 1997. The sample would then consist of one observation for a downgraded bank in May 1999 plus eight observations of non-downgraded banks in May 1999 plus one observation for the downgraded bank in October 1997 plus nine observations of non-downgraded banks in October 1997, as the bank which eventually is downgraded two years later would still be included as a non-downgrade. Sample size in this illustration would be 1 ϩ 8 ϩ 1 ϩ 9 ϭ 19 observations. 9. Sixteen banks were downgraded to C, ten banks to C/D, four to D and one to D/E. 
DD depends on V A (the value of assets), σ A (asset volatility), and D (the face value of debt liabilities), as well as on interest rate and time parameters. Though unobservable, the first two parameters can be calculated from observable market value of equity capital (V E ) and the volatility of equity (σ E ) using the system of equations below:
Following Ronn and Verma (1989) we solved this system of equations by using the generalised reduced gradient method. The necessary inputs are equity market capitalisation, V E , equity volatility, σ E , total debt liabilities, D, and the risk-free rate, r. N denotes the normal distribution. We used monthly averages of V E , obtained from Datastream. σ E was estimated as the standard deviation of daily absolute equity returns and, as proposed in Marcus and Shaked (1984) , we took the six-month moving average (backwards) to reduce noise. The presumption is that market participants do not use the very volatile short term estimates, but more smoothed volatility measures.
10 D was obtained from semi-annual published accounts and are interpolated (using a cubic spline) to yield monthly observations. The time to the maturing of the debt, T, was set to one year, which is the common benchmark assumption when one has no particular information about the maturity structure. Finally, we used short term government bond rates as risk free rates, r.
11 Below we report results for the negative distance to default, ϪDD, rather than the distance to default, such that an increase in the indicator signals greater fragility, in line with the spread. This is intended to enhance the readability of the tables below.
The spread of subordinated debt relative to the risk free rate, S, is defined as
where Y T Bit denotes the yield of a subordinated bond B i of bank i at time t with a remaining term to maturity T and Y T Ct denotes a corresponding government bond of the bank's country of incorporation C at time t with a remaining term to maturity T. We used the standard Newton iterative method to calculate the bond yields to maturity. In smaller countries the most liquid bank issues tended to be bonds denominated in foreign currency (DM, euro, USD and in two cases, yen). Hence, we matched the foreign currency denominated bank bonds with government bonds issued in the same currency, again matching on all other criteria. We restricted the sample to subordinated bonds with an issue size of more than euro 150 million, as 10. This is not an efficient procedure as it imposes the volatility to be constant. However, equity volatility is accurately estimated for a specific time interval, as long as leverage does not change substantially over that period (see for example Bongini et al. 2002) .
11. In the calculation of DD we assume a log-normal distribution for the underlying asset values. As pointed out by Bliss (2000) , this assumption may not hold in practice. He argues that the normal distribution does not take into account that closer to the default point it is likely that there are adjustments in debt liabilities. It has also been pointed out that the assumption of a one-year term to maturity for the debt does not hold in practice. We felt, however, that to explore alternatives, while extremely interesting, would be far beyond the scope of this paper. Hancock and Kwast (2001) argue that liquidity tends to be adequate for bonds of this size. We limited the sample to "plain vanilla," fixed rate, straight, subordinated debt issues with the exception of five banks, for which we were unable to find sufficiently liquid fixed rate bonds.
12 In these five cases we used floating rate bonds and matched on remaining term to maturity and on the base rate (LIBOR, EURIBOR, etc.) of the adjustable coupon. 13 We use the "support rating" of a bank issued by Fitch/IBCA to indicate the likelihood of public support. Fitch/IBCA rates the likelihood of support on a scale of one to five. A grade of one indicates existence of an assured legal guarantee for a bank. A grade of two is assigned to a bank, for which in Fitch/IBCA's opinion state support would be forthcoming, even though this is not explicit. A rating of three to five is given to banks where support may come from the parent organisation or other owners, rather than from public sources. Complete definitions of the Fitch/ IBCA support ratings are given in the Appendix. The share of banks with a support rating of one or two is quite high (around 65% in the equity sample and 80% in the bond sample). This is not surprising, since we are considering banks with a material securities market presence as an issuer. We considered the possibility that there is some systematic correlation between the country of origin of the bank and the Fitch/IBCA support rating, but this does not seem to be the case. Size does matter, however, as banks with a support rating of one or two tend to be significantly larger compared to those with a rating of three to five. Their average total debt liabilities are roughly ten times higher.
How can we distinguish banks on the basis of the likelihood of being bailed out as our definition of a major banking problem ultimately involves some intervention at a later stage? Public coverage of different stakeholders may be incomplete and different stakeholders may be wiped out altogether. This is especially true for shareholders. In addition, it is important to distinguish between ex ante expectation and ex post realisation. Even if ex post all banks survived and all stakeholders avoided losses, market participants ex ante may still have assigned some non-zero probability to not being bailed out. As we will see, for some (large) banks with Fitch/IBCA support ratings of one and two, subordinated debt holders in fact assign a probability of one to being bailed out and spreads are useless as a predictor of bank fragility. For other banks and for equity holders this is not the case.
Recall that relative to the universe of 103 Fitch/IBCA rated banks, 14 we were able to obtain meaningful subordinated bond price data for only 59 banks. Sample selection may be a problem, if the banks in sample differ in their probability of a downgrade to C or below relative to those in the universe of banks. This is not the case. However, the banks in the sample are larger than all rated banks (the universe), but the 12. All the bonds in our sample are "plain vanilla" issues in the sense that there are no bonds with call or put options, nor are there any convertible bonds in the sample.
13. For example if the bank bond was variable coupon bond with LIBOR ϩ100bp, we matched it with a variable rate government bond with a coupon also based on LIBOR.
14. This universe is substantially different from all EU banks. We would argue, however, that market indicators are precisely of most use in case of large, complex financial institutions. difference is not statistically significant. A bias may also arise due to differences in data availability for the banks that are in the sample. If banks that eventually are downgraded remain in the sample only a relatively short period of time prior to the downgrade, the proportional hazard model may overstate the predictive power of indicators. 15 However, the average time period in the sample for banks, which eventually were downgraded, is 34 months. This should give us ample data to obtain unbiased estimates. 16 The sample, for which we were able to calculate DD consists of 86 banks. The probability of problems in the sample is identical to that in the universe. The average time of banks, which eventually were downgraded, is one month longer in the equity than in the bond sample. Again, this should give us sufficient data to estimate the model.
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics are given in Table 3 .
DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE
The mean comparison tests reported in Table 4 are intended to provide a first assessment of whether ϪDD and S are able to distinguish weaker banks within our 15. Given that we chose a fixed starting point for our sample (1991) and given that we drop the observations for all downgraded banks after the downgrade, the time period that non-downgraded banks remain in the sample is longer. This by itself should not constitute a problem for the estimation. However, if downgrades occur disproportionately at the beginning of the sample period, i.e. in 1991-94, this could result in overstating the predictive power of our indicators in the proportional hazard model. Table 2 shows that this is not the case.
16. The average period in the sample of "non-failing" banks is, of course, longer with 76 months. Notice that the maximum number of observations per bank is limited by our sampling period to 131 months. Notes: Two sub-sample t-tests (unequal variances) are reported for the difference in mean values of (ϪDD tϪx ) and S tϪx in the sub-samples of downgraded (SATUS ϭ 1) and non-downgraded banks (STATUS ϭ 0). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. a Mean (STATUS ϭ 0) -Mean (SATUS ϭ 1). b t-Statistics for testing the one-sided hypothesis that the difference is negative.
c Banks with a support rating of three to five and excluding UK banks. data set. We examined whether the indicators lead downgrades by performing mean comparison tests for various time leads (lead times of 3, 6, 12, 18 and 24 months). Hence, one should read Table 4 as follows: we compare the mean of the market indicators for banks downgraded at time t Ϫ x to the mean of the market indicators of all other observations (where there was no downgrade at time t), where x ϭ 3, 6, 12 …. We constructed the sample for the tests as for the logit model described above.
The results indicate that the banks that were downgraded subsequently had a significantly higher mean value of (ϪDD) than those that did not. This is true up to 24 months prior to the downgrade. We also find in the second panel that downgraded banks had higher spreads and that spreads increase as the downgrade approaches. However, the difference between the two groups of banks is never statistically significant. As we argued above, the weaker predictive power of S may be due to the government's perceived willingness to absorb losses on behalf of private creditors. Hence, we limit the sample to those banks with a support rating of three or higher (i.e. banks that should generally not receive public support). However, the results were virtually unchanged (output omitted). Only when we also drop UK banks, the spread is significantly related to banking problems (third panel of Table 4 ). The spreads of UK banks are significantly higher than those of continental European banks in the sample.
17 Consistent with this, Sironi (2003) found that UK banks' primary market subordinated debt spreads are much higher than those of banks in the rest of Europe. He attributes this finding to differences in the perceived safety net. However, if one supposes that the Fitch/IBCA support rating correctly captures the likelihood of public support, this explanation is not supported by our data.
18 Alternative explanations could include the obligation of UK pension funds to purchase government bonds of a certain maturity, which in turn could artificially depress the yields of these bonds. Further, political economy considerations relating to the structure of the financial system and the institutional set up for bank failures could play a role (Gropp and Olters 2001) . That paper shows in a political economy model that the likelihood of a bail out may be a function of the degree of independence from the political process of the authority deciding on closure or bail out. It also shows that bailouts should be more likely in bank based than in market-based financial systems. Both factors could make bail outs less likely in the UK relative to continental Europe and, hence, result in higher spreads on UK bank bonds. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the issue further. In the following, when we examine spreads we will either control for UK banks using a dummy variable or present results without UK banks.
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS

Estimation Methods
We used two different econometric models to investigate the signalling properties of the market-based indicators of bank fragility. The first is a standard logit model of the form:
where ψ( ) represents the cumulative logistic distribution, DI tϪx the market indicator at time t Ϫ x, and STATUS t ϭ { 1 if bank was downgraded to C or below at time t 0 otherwise . We estimate the model for different horizons separately, i.e. we investigate the predictive power of our two indicators 3, 6, 12, 18 and 24 months before the downgrade. Significant and positive coefficients of the lagged market indicators would support the use of ϪDD or S as early indicators of bank fragility (Hypothesis 1).
17. The average spread of UK banks is 208 basis points (894 observations) and the average spread of all other banks is 44 basis points (2783 observations). The difference is significant at the 1% level.
18. Sixty-one percent of UK banks have a support rating of one or two, while this share is 64% for all other banks.
We created a dummy variable DSUPP, which equals one when the Fitch/IBCA "support rating" is one or two in order to control for the perceived implicit safety net. In order to test for the impact on the quality of the signal from market indicators, we interacted the variable with the market indicators. Given a significantly positive coefficient on S, an insignificant sum of the coefficients on S and DSUPP*S would suggest that for banks covered by an implicit or explicit safety net, spreads are poor indicators. In addition, a significantly positive coefficient on the sum of -DD and DSUPP*ϪDD (given a significant coefficient on -DD), would be consistent with Hypothesis 3, i.e. that -DD is a useful indicator even for banks implicitly or explicitly insured. Since we use several observations for the same bank in case the bank is not downgraded during our sample period, our observations are not independent within banks, while they are independent across banks. Therefore, we adjusted the standard errors for clustering using the generalised method based on Huber (1967) .
Our second model is a Cox proportional hazard model of the form:
where h(t,DI,X) represents the proportional hazard function, h 0 (t) the baseline hazard, and X the control variables (see below). Again, we calculated robust standard errors, as we had multiple observations per bank and used Lin and Wei's (1989) adjustment to allow for correlation of the residuals within banks. The model parameters were estimated by maximising the partial log-likelihood function
where j indexes the ordered times of a downgrade t(j) (j ϭ 1,2,...,D). D j is the set of d j observations that are downgraded at t(j) and R j is the set of observations that are at risk at time t(j). The model allows for censoring in the sense that not all banks were downgraded during the sample period.
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The two models provide a robustness check whether equity and bond market indicators have signalling property with regard to downgrades. In addition, the two models provide different insights. The logit model yields an estimate of the unconditional probability of a downgrade at a pre-specified future point in time (three months ahead, six months ahead, etc.). A hazard model allows us to approximate the probability of being downgraded in the following month, conditional on not being downgraded in the period up to that month. Hence, the proportional hazard model not only uses the level of an indicator at a certain point of time, but also how long the indicator remains at this level. This, conceptually, results in a more efficient use of the available information and ultimately should lead to better discriminatory power and improved forecasts.
19. For more details on estimating hazard models see Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) and for a more recent treatment, Wooldridge (2002, chapter 20 Table 5A reports the results from estimating logit models with different time leads using the distance to default as the indicator. A shorter distance to default (i.e. an increase in ϪDD) increases the likelihood of a downgrade. The respective coefficient is significant at least at the 10% level for the 6, 12 and 18-month leads. Hence, we find support for Hypothesis 1: -DD appears to have predictive properties of an increased (unconditional) likelihood of a downgrade up to 18 months in advance. The coefficient ceases to be significant for more than 18 months ahead of the event. The coefficient of the three-month lead is also insignificant. 20 We also find that the coefficient of DSUPP*(ϪDD) tϪx is never statistically significant from zero. Further, the sum of ϪDD tϪx and DSUPP*(ϪDD) tϪx is significantly different from zero at the 5% level for all lead times except for x ϭ 24. Hence, the safety net does not appear to be important for the predictive power of the distance to default as an indicator of bank fragility. Equity holders seem to expect losses even in case of default of systemically important banks.
Estimation Results
The results for spreads, S, support Hypothesis 1 only for non-UK banks (see Table 5B , output for the sample with UK banks omitted). The coefficients for lead times of up to 18 months are significant at least at the 5% level. The results also highlight that it is important to control for the expectation of public support in case of spreads. The coefficient of DSUPP*S tϪx is significant and negative and a joint hypothesis test reveals that the coefficient on the spread is zero for the banks with a high expectation of public support. This is in contrast to the results for ϪDD and suggests that subordinated debt holders assign a probability of one to being bailed out for some banks and, hence, bond prices do not adjust in line with risks for these banks. Both S and ϪDD explain relatively little of the variation in the dependent variable: pseudo R 2 is below 0.1 for all horizons. The economic magnitudes of the effects are in line with this low explanatory power. Evaluated at the mean, for ϪDD an increase of one has the largest effect at the 18 months horizon with a 1.1% increase in the probability of a downgrade. We find the smallest effects at 3 and 24 months with 0.4%. In contrast, a one basis point increase in spreads is associated with a 0.03% increase in the probability of a downgrade 3 and 6 months before the downgrade and quickly diminishes to zero at longer horizons. 21 These patterns correspond closely to Hypothesis 2: the signal to noise ratio for the spread is quite low further away from default.
20. This seems to be due to the erratic behaviour of asset volatility close to default, potentially due to trading irregularities and/or non-linearity in the payoff to equity. Moreover, beyond some value, the marginal impact of DD on the probability of failure becomes effectively zero. In part this motivates the use of a dummy variable (specifying DD beyond some threshold), rather than DD itself in the proportional hazard model estimated below.
21. In the logit model
gives the marginal effects, with Λ being the logistic distribution. The results of discrete choice models may be quite sensitive to the underlying distributional assumptions, in particular in cases where the distribution of the dependent variable is as skewed as in this sample. Only around 4% of the samples are downgraded observations. Hence, we estimated also the corresponding probit models. We found essentially unchanged results, both in terms of magnitude and significance. 22 Next, we turn to the results from the proportional hazard model. Table 6 gives the hazard ratios and corresponding P-values for five different models. In the model with only ϪDD, the hazard ratio is significant (at the 5% level) and has the expected positive sign. The hazard ratio is increasing in the values of the fragility indicators, which is consistent with the logit results. The table also shows results for tests of the proportional hazard assumption (i.e. the zero-slope test), which amounts to testing, whether the null hypothesis of a constant log hazard-function over time holds for the individual covariates as well as globally. For ϪDD, this assumption is violated. The payoff from equity is equivalent to the payoff of a call option on the assets of the firm with a strike price equal to the book value of debt. Hence, there is a nonlinear relationship between the distance to default and downgrades, which may have been the reason for the rejection of the proportional hazard assumption. One simple way of capturing this non-linearity is to use a dummy variable:
where Ϫ3.2 represents the top 25th percentile of the distribution of ϪDD. Hence, in this specification, we investigate whether banks with "short" distances to default are more likely to be downgraded. We find that this indicator is significant at the 1% level and the proportional hazard assumption is no longer rejected. As in the logit estimations, the spread alone is not significant, although it does have a positive sign. When we exclude UK banks and control for the safety net, S becomes significant at the 1% level. For ϪDD the inclusion of the safety net dummy or the UK dummy do not affect its coefficient, as in the logit specification (output omitted). We will examine the economic magnitude of the coefficient in the context of type I/type II classification errors in the following section.
So far we have examined the question whether market prices have any unconditional predictive power with respect to rating downgrades. Given that we answer this question in the affirmative, we now turn to the question whether they add anything to the information contained in other data. First, we examine whether the market indicators contain information, which is not already summarised in the Fitch/IBCA rating. Hence, we re-estimate the logit models controlling for the individual rating at the time the market indicators were observed. The results given in Table 7A for ϪDD are similar to those reported in Table 5A , albeit the significance of ϪDD is reduced. The rating itself is significant at least at the 10% level at all horizons, but diminishes in magnitude as one moves away from the downgrade. The results suggest that ϪDD adds information to Fitch/IBCA ratings and this information is more valuable further away from the downgrade. For spreads (Table 7B ) the magnitude and the size of the coefficients are unchanged relative to the specification without initial ratings. The coefficient on the rating tends to be insignificant and declines away from the downgrade. 23 Next, we explore whether market indicators add information to that already available from banks' accounting data. Conceptually, this is obvious. Market-based indicators should fully reflect past accounting information as well as forward looking expectations about the prospects of the bank. The choice of which accounting variables to use is somewhat arbitrary. We followed the previous literature (e.g. FDIC, 1994 , Sironi, 2003 , and Flannery and Sorescu, 1996 and considered a set of accounting indicators emulating the categories of CAMEL ratings (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity). In order to maintain a sufficient sample size in the set of downgraded banks, we had to consider only four out of five indicators due to data limitations. Consequently, liquidity was dropped from the indicator. The composite score is calculated as follows: Notes: Excluding UK banks. All models are estimated using STATUS as the dependent variable. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Standard errors adjusted for clustering in parentheses.
a F-test for the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of (S tϪx ) and DSUPP*(S tϪx ) is zero.
χ 2 values reported.
3. We divided the ranking distributions in four quartiles, and assigned a score varying from zero (best) to three (worst) to the position of the bank in the rankings. We obtained the composite score by simply summing up the scores for each indicator, yielding a variable ranging from zero (a bank in excellent condition) to 12 (a bank in very poor condition). SCORE was not available for all banks and all time periods in the sample. In order to ensure comparability, we re-estimated the model for S and ϪDD only for those observations for which SCORE was available. In order to save space, we report results for the 12 months horizon only.
24
Comparing the results for the two different samples (Tables 5A and 5B with  Table 8 ) for the model with the market indicator only, we find that the results are robust across the different samples. We also find that accounting variables have some predictive power with respect to downgrades. The coefficient on SCORE is positive and significant at the 1% level in all specifications. The R 2 in the models with SCORE alone is around 0.2. In the first three columns of Table 8 we see that the distance to default adds some information to SCORE. The distance-to-default is positive and significant at the 5% level, and the model fit, as measured by the pseudo R 2 increases from 0.17 to 0.19. In addition, the inclusion of (ϪDD) does not change the magnitude or significance of SCORE and the inclusion of SCORE does not change the significance of (ϪDD) while the magnitude is only slightly reduced. This suggests that the distance to default and accounting information are complementary to each other.
Empirical estimates from the same exercise for spreads are presented in the next three columns of Table 8 . They suggest that spreads also add some information to that already available from accounting data. The model combining spreads with SCORE has a better fit relative to the one containing SCORE only. The lower significance of S and the reduction in its magnitude in the model with SCORE suggests that there might be some substitutability between the information in spreads and in accounting information.
In the seventh column of Table 8 we report results for a logit model with both indicators together. While in such a case the sample size reduces quite significantly, both ϪDD and S enter significantly, and the fit of the model is better than for each individual indicator alone. When we add SCORE to the model with both market indicators (column 9), ϪDD is not significant while S and SCORE are significant at the 5% and 1% percent level, respectively. The R 2 increases from 0.44 (SCORE only) and 0.18 (market indicators only) to 0.49 when combining both market indicators with SCORE. The combination of high explanatory power and low significance of some coefficients suggests substantial collinearity and some substitutability between the different indicators. 24. In order to ensure comparability with the results reported in Tables 5A and 5B we tried to keep the sample sizes as similar as the ones in the previous exercises. Hence, since SCORE is available only on an annual basis, we repeated it for each DD and S observation belonging to the same year.
25. In this model, the coefficient for (ϪDD) has a negative sign, albeit not significant. This result is entirely due to an outlier (Banca Nazionale del Lavoro with a ϪDD of around Ϫ4.5), which given the small number of downgraded banks in the sample (nine banks) tends to influence the results rather significantly. Without that bank, ϪDD becomes positive, although remains insignificant. Notes: All models are estimated using STATUS as the dependent variable. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. SCORE is a synthetic variable summarising the ranking of the bank with regard to four indicators representing respectively capital adequacy, asset quality, efficiency, and profitability. Standard errors adjusted for clustering in parentheses. Excluding UK banks; sample consists of banks for which spreads and SCORE are available. These findings are largely confirmed in the proportional hazard analysis (Table 9 ). First, we are able to confirm the finding that the results seem to be quite robust with respect to different samples, as the results reported in Table 6 and in Table 9 are consistent, both in terms of economic magnitude and statistical significance. Adding ϪDD to a model with SCORE yields statistically significant estimates for both variables and improves the overall fit of the model. The proportional hazard model also suggests that spreads may add some information to SCORE. In the combined model S is significant at the 5% level and has retained its economic magnitude. The improvement in model fit is quite substantial. Moreover, as in the logit specification, the coefficient on DSUPP*S loses its significance when including SCORE. 26 In the final three columns, we-as before-examine models with both market indicators included simultaneously. Without SCORE, both market indicators are significant at the 5% level. ϪDD's coefficient is also much larger than in other specifications, suggesting that it is beneficial to use a model with both indicators simultaneously. Finally we estimate a model with both market indicators and SCORE.
As for the logit model, the statistical significance of most variables is reduced; only ϪDD is significant at the 10% level. However, the Wald statistics suggests that model fit significantly improves relative to models with market indicators or SCORE alone. Again, the lack of statistical significance of individual coefficients and the high joint significance suggests multicollinearity and some substitutability among indicators.
IN-SAMPLE FORECASTING
Finally, we evaluate the potential usefulness of including market information in supervisory early warning models of bank fragility. The standard approach to evaluating the performance of forecasting models is to consider classification errors (types I and II). We follow convention and define type I errors as missed downgrades (i.e. indicator classifies "no downgrade," when the bank was in fact downgraded) and type II errors as mis-classified non-downgrades (i.e. the indicator classifies "downgrade" when the bank was in fact not downgraded). Based on the logit models in Table 8 , we report two exercises. One, we examine the changes in classification errors of a model with only market indicators relative to models with market indicators and SCORE. Second, we examine the classification errors of combining the two market indicators and then adding SCORE. The results are presented in Table 10 .
Looking at the market indicators individually, they show an overall classification accuracy of 51% (distance to default) and 70% (spread). However, spreads do a relatively poor job of picking up failures, as the type I error is 53%; while the distance to default does better with a type I error of 27%. In case of the distance to default this translates into predicting 16 of 22 downgrades and 484 of 953 
2.06
Notes: Estimated using Cox regression. Partial Log-likelihood function given in the text. SCORE is a synthetic variable summarising the ranking of the bank with regard to four indicators representing respectively capital adequacy, asset quality, efficiency, and profitability. Dependent variable: duration (in months) until downgrade or censoring. Standard errors corrected for clustering using Wei and Lin's (1989) non-downgrades accurately. Spreads predict six of 19 downgrades and 235 of 331 non-downgrades accurately. Considering SCORE individually yields a classification accuracy of 75% and 71% in the ϪDD sample and the spread sample, respectively. The addition of market indicators to SCORE brings about an improvement in the classification accuracy of the model which stems from a reduction in the type II errors: the overall classification accuracy increases to 77% in the ϪDD sample and to 74% for the spread.
Combining the two market indicators yields an improvement in the classification accuracy of the model, again largely due to a reduction in type II errors. More than half of all failures continue to be missed. Nevertheless, the results suggest that combining the two indicators reduces type II errors quite significantly. What about the additional information of both market indicators relative to accounting information ("SCORE") alone? In the (smaller) sample, SCORE alone provides an overall classification accuracy of 80%. Adding both market indicators yields an improvement to 85%. All of the improvement comes through a reduction in type II errors as before.
27 While these improvements are far from dramatic, they do suggest some useful role for market information in early warning models.
These points are re-enforced, when evaluating the predictive performance of the proportional hazard model. Table 11 gives the probabilities of not experiencing a downgrade ("survival") based on Kaplan-Meier survivor functions. The figures represent the proportion of banks "surviving" for a certain amount of time with a certain characteristic. For example, consider the model with ϪDD only. After 36 months, 68.2% of banks with -DD Ͼ Ϫ3.2 are not downgraded to C or below, compared to 85.2% of those banks with ϪDD ≤ Ϫ3.2. In terms of classification errors this means that 68.2% of banks are classified as good even though they were downgraded (type I error) and 14.8% were classified as bad even though they had not been downgraded (type II error). Using ϪDD Ͼ Ϫ3.2 as the explanatory variable gives us total discriminatory power of 17% after 36 months. In the final column, 27. Accounting data alone classify seven of 31 non-downgrades as downgrades, accounting data plus (ϪDD) six of 31 and both indicators plus accounting information five of 31. we report the log rank test for the equality of the survivor functions. For ϪDD Ͼ Ϫ3.2 the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Again let us examine the two questions of interest: does using both market indicators give us more discriminatory power than one alone? And do market indicators add information to SCORE? In general the answer to both questions is yes. ϪDD alone after observing the indicator for 48 months has a discriminatory power of 30%; S alone after being observed for 48 months has a discriminatory power of 41%. Both indicators together have a discriminatory power of 43%. We also find that ϪDD has to be observed for some time in order to yield discriminatory power. We attribute this to its relatively high volatility. On the other hand, observing spreads for more than 24 months yields no additional information. These two results correspond closely to the patterns of predictive power we found in case of the logit models. As to the second question, adding either ϪDD, S, or both, to a model with SCORE only yields about 20% points in additional discriminatory power. As before, the added discriminatory power comes from a reduction in type II errors. Adding ϪDD to SCORE yields a reduction in type II errors of 31% points, adding S to SCORE a reduction of 38% points and adding both a reduction of 18% points. Note that these figures are not strictly comparable, as the sample is smaller when we analyse both indicators simultaneously. 28 Finally, the significance of the log rank test increases in all cases when combining indicators relative to models with either market information or accounting information only.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyse market price based measures as early indicators of bank fragility. We find support for using both indicators as leading indicators of bank fragility, where bank fragility is measured as a downgrade of the Fitch/IBCA individual rating to C or below. We document that such a rating was generally associated with an intervention at the bank, either through public authorities or through parent banks. Further, we find that while the distance to default predicts downgrades between 6 and 18 months in advance, its predictive properties are quite poor closer to the downgrade. In contrast, spreads' predictive powers diminish beyond 12 months prior to the downgrade. The results further suggest that spreads are useful predictors only for banks, which are not (implicitly or explicitly) publicly insured against default, while the public safety net does not appear to affect the predictive power of the distance to default. We find, as in Sironi (2003) , that the spreads of UK banks are significantly higher in a given ratings class than the spreads of continental European banks.
28. Note that type I errors are actually slightly increased by adding market indicators, which, however, is largely due to the precise definition of the cut-off point we used to define the indicator variable. We attempted to maximise discriminatory power (i.e. total error) here; alternatively we could have designed indicator variables which would have minimised type I or type II errors. Qualitatively, the results are unaffected by this choice.
The indicators provide some additional information relative to accounting data alone. Comparing the performance of logit models to proportional hazard models we find that proportional hazard models have the inherent advantage to yield continually improving forecasts as the indicators are observed through time. Finally, we find support for the notion that the two indicators together have more discriminatory power in predicting downgrades than each alone. We perform an analysis of the classification errors of the indicators and find that the main use of market information may be to reduce type II errors. Overall, we interpret our findings in a way to suggest that supervisors (and possibly the literature) may want to devote more attention to the equity market when considering the use of the information embedded in the market prices of the securities issued by banks. Equity market data could provide supervisors with useful information, which is complementary to accounting data and subordinated debenture spreads.
This recommendation should be qualified by the usual argument that applies to any variable used in forecasting. The mere fact that an indicator is found not to enter significantly in a forecasting regression does not necessarily mean that authorities should be advised not to pay attention to the variable. For the absence of forecasting power may simply imply that the variable is already being used. Conversely, the mere fact that an indicator is found to be useful in forecasting bank fragility does not tell us much about the desirability of a policy that involves feedback from that indicator. The ability of the indicator to signal the underlying sources of financial fragility that one wants to respond to may be impaired by the very fact that the authorities responds to it. Specifically, if it became apparent that supervisors use market prices as indicators of bank fragility and if supervisors conditioned their intervention on market prices, market participants may reduce their monitoring effort and, hence, stop providing useful signals. Market participants may learn to rely on regulatory discipline as a substitute for market discipline, as shown for example in DeYoung et al. (2001) .
It is important to highlight one caveat in the interpretation of the results. The finding that market indicators tend to add information to a model with accounting data should only be taken as suggestive evidence that supervisors should include market information in their supervisory models. The reason is that the accounting data used in this paper were obtained from Bankscope, a publicly available database. Supervisors may have access to accounting data of higher quality and at a higher frequency. Hence, we would suggest interpreting our findings as a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for the use of market indicators in early warning models.
Finally, it is important to stress that there might be considerable practical difficulties in using either of the indicators proposed in this paper. For example, the distance to default, apart from its relative computational complexity, may be sensitive to shifts in derived asset volatility. This, in turn, may be due to irregularities in the equity trading in the period closer to default. Further, the measure is quite sensitive to the measure of equity volatility used and distributional assumptions about equity returns. Similarly, the calculation of bond spreads may be difficult in practice, because of relatively illiquid bond markets, resulting in noisy price data for bank bonds and the lack of reliable risk-free benchmarks (especially in smaller countries).
APPENDIX
Fitch/IBCA Ratings Definitions Fitch/IBCA's Individual Ratings attempt to assess how a bank would be viewed if it were entirely independent, and could not rely on external support. These ratings are designed to assess a bank's exposure to, appetite for, and management of risk, and thus represent the view on the likelihood that it would run into significant difficulties. The principal factors analysed to evaluate the bank and determine these ratings include profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating environment, and prospects.
Fitch-IBCA distinguishes among the following categories: A. A very strong bank. Characteristics may include outstanding profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating environment, or prospects. B. A strong bank. There are no major concerns regarding the bank. Characteristics may include strong profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating environment or prospects. C. An adequate bank which, however, possesses one or more troublesome aspects.
There may be some concerns regarding its profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating environment or prospects. D. A bank which has weaknesses of internal and/or external origin. There are concerns regarding its profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating environment or prospects. E. A bank with very serious problems which either requires or is likely to require external support. Note that, in addition, there are gradations among these five rating categories, i.e. A/B, B/C, C/D, and D/E.
The Support Ratings do not assess the quality of a bank. Rather, they are Fitch-IBCA's assessment of whether the bank would receive support should this be necessary.
1. A bank for which there is a clear legal guarantee on the part of the State, or a bank of such importance both internationally and domestically that, in Fitch-IBCA's opinion, support from the State would be forthcoming, if necessary. The State in question must clearly be prepared and able to support its principal banks. 2. A bank for which, in our opinion, state support would be forthcoming, even in the absence of a legal guarantee. This could be, for example, because of the bank's importance to the economy or its historic relationship with the authorities. 3. A bank or bank holding company which has institutional owners of sufficient reputation and possessing such resources that, in our opinion, support would be forthcoming, if necessary.
